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Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis:
Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct
By
Andrew I. Gavil* & Steven C. Salop**
Introduction
From its origins in the Sherman Act of 18901 and the Clayton Act of 1914,2 U.S. antitrust
law has prohibited “exclusionary” conduct: conduct by one or more rivals that has a tendency to
impede competition by disadvantaging one or more competitors. Such conduct can be challenged
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act when it involves concerted action that unreasonably restrains
trade.3 Exclusionary conduct also can be challenged under Section 2 of the Sherman Act when it

*

Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges that
the preparation of this article was supported by a 2019 summer research stipend provided by the
Howard University School of Law.
**

Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center. No outside parties
contributed to the funding of this project. The authors would like to thank Professors Jonathan B.
Baker, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert Hovenkamp, Alan J. Meese, A. Douglas Melamed, Fiona Scott
Morton, and John M. Newman, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
for helpful comments and discussions of previous drafts of this article.
1

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2018).

2

15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2018).

3

Examples include concerted refusals to deal and exclusive dealing. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (“This Court has
long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are so likely to restrict
competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned as per se
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“Under the rule of reason, an exclusive dealing arrangement will be unlawful only if
its ‘probable effect’ is to substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.”).
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constitutes an attempt to monopolize4 or “monopolization.”5 As one commentator has described
it, exclusion has always been a “core concern” of antitrust law.6
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil,7 both Section 1 and
Section 2 have been implemented with a “rule of reason.”8 The rule of reason has served the
essential purpose of differentiating conduct that might adversely affect a competitor in the
normal course of competition from conduct that handicaps it in a way that significantly impairs
the competitive process. The analysis also generally includes direct or circumstantial evidence of
“market power,” what Justice Stephen Breyer has described as the ability to “make a difference”
in the marketplace.9
Importantly, and to operationalize it as a useful framework for courts evaluating
competitive effects, the rule of reason has evolved into a recognized burden-shifting framework

4

See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (finding that a plaintiff
alleging attempt to monopolize “must prove a dangerous probability of actual monopolization,
which has generally required a definition of the relevant market and examination of market
power”).
5

See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“A firm violates §
2 only when it acquires or maintains, or attempts to acquire or maintain, a monopoly by engaging
in exclusionary conduct . . . .”). Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018), also
prohibits a variety of exclusionary practices. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320, 325-29 (1961) (discussing scope and standards for applying Section 3).
6

Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 Antitrust L.J. 527, 532
(2013) (“[A]nticompetitive exclusion, like anticompetitive collusion, must be understood as a
core concern of competition policy.”).
7

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).

8

Id. at 61-62; see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d. at 59 (noting that post-Standard Oil, the courts have
applied a “rule of reason” approach to cases arising under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
9

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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that is common to both Section 1 and Section 2.10 The plaintiff, public or private, must meet an
initial burden of production sufficient to show that the conduct is likely to be anticompetitive. If
it makes that showing, the burden of production shifts to the defendant, who can undermine the
plaintiff’s evidence and thus prevent the burden from shifting, and/or offer affirmative evidence
showing a recognized procompetitive justification likely to eliminate any anticompetitive
tendency of its conduct. If it does so, the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion,
can respond in kind by undermining the defendant’s evidence of justification, and/or proffering
additional evidence to show that the conduct remains likely to have an unreasonably
anticompetitive effect. In the context of Section 1, this approach has been described as a
“continuum” that can vary in application with the strength of the parties’ respective evidence of
probable competitive harm.11
Despite its origins as a prominent feature of antitrust law, and this shared framework for
evaluating anticompetitive conduct of various forms, exclusionary conduct has been the focus of
far more robust debate over the last half-century than have many forms of concerted action.
Conservative commentary has long been skeptical of exclusionary conduct allegations, even
those involving firms with substantial market power. This conservative critique of antitrust law
has been highly influential and has facilitated a transformation of antitrust standards of conduct
since the 1970s. The combination of objections from the business community, conservative

10

Jonathan B. Baker & Andrew I. Gavil, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Antitrust Law’s
Rule(s) of Reason, in 2 Douglas Ginsburg: An Antitrust Professor on the Bench, Liber
Amicorum (Nicolas Charbit, ed., forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349853
[https://perma.cc/MZ3C-GA68].
11

Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 Southern Cal. L. Rev. 733, 759 (2012); see also Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at
780-81.
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academic criticism, and political change launched a generation-long movement toward
increasingly more permissive standards of conduct.
Although these changes have taken many forms, all were influenced by a common and
repeated message: competition law was over-deterrent. It was prone to condemn conduct that
was likely beneficial in many instances, or competitively inconsequential at worst.12
Conservatives attributed this tendency to bright line rules of liability, undemanding burdens of
proof of anticompetitive effect, lack of appreciation for efficiency, and the limited competence of
antitrust decision-makers to correctly differentiate procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct.
These commentators also espoused a range of assumptions based on their views that previously
suspect types of exclusionary conduct were more likely procompetitive and that highly
concentrated markets were likely to perform well.13
Critics relied heavily on the assumption that the costs of false positive errors (i.e.,
erroneous convictions and over-deterrence) far exceeded the costs of false negatives (i.e.,
erroneous acquittals and under-deterrence). These critics further assumed that the effects of false
positives would be lasting because of the enduring impact of court decisions. By contrast, they

12

See generally Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 506, 515-34 (1974) [hereinafter Posner, Exclusionary Practices] (discussing predatory
pricing, vertical mergers, exclusive dealing, and boycotts); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979).
13

In this article, we differentiate “assumptions” from “presumptions”--a term of more specific
meaning in the context of litigation and burdens of proof. As we explain in Parts II and III, infra,
many mistaken conservative assumptions have provided the basis for procompetitive
presumptions in antitrust law.
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assumed that the effects of false negatives would largely be dissipated by the self-correcting
tendencies of markets.14
The proscribed cure was a combination of greater economic sophistication, reliance on
bright-line rules of non-liability, and lessened reliance on bright-line rules of liability. The
influence of this approach did not end with the analysis of particular practices. The goal of
preventing false positives provided a focus for the comparative evaluation of alternative legal
rules,15 and became a barometer for evaluating the scope of antitrust prohibitions.16 This
translated into a call for a higher evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in cases alleging exclusionary

14

For one of the oft-cited illustrations of this set of arguments, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1984). For a criticism of its approach, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 Geo. L.J. 271, 281–89 (1987). For a recent reconsideration
of one of Easterbrook’s foundation premises, that the consequences of false positives will be
systematically more harmful than those of false negatives, see Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits
of Antitrust in the 21st Century, (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 2020-06, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3533549 [https://perma.cc/CAH9-UBPJ]
(discussing how Easterbrook’s argument that antitrust should be calibrated to minimize error
costs was sound, but subsequent scholarship has undermined his specific assumption with regard
to the relative harm of false positives and false negatives).
15

See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of ‘Error Cost’ Analysis: What’s Wrong with
Antitrust’s Right, 80 Antitrust L.J. 1, 6 (2015) (“Contemporary antitrust conservatives have
relied on the error cost framework to advocate various antitrust rules that would place a ‘thumb
on the scales’ in favor of permitting firms to engage in much of the conduct that Judge Bork
perceived as beneficial.”).
16

See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (“Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’ . . . The cost of
false positives counsels against an undue expansion of §2 liability.”) (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1333 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A mistaken grant of an injunction may elevate
this price, harming the consumers that antitrust laws are designed to protect.”).
-5-

conduct, which included a requirement of more economic evidence to support competitive harm
allegations.17
Many of the assumptions that guided this generation-long retrenchment of antitrust rules
were mistaken, and advances in the law and in economic analysis have rendered them
anachronistic. This is especially the case with respect to exclusionary conduct.18 Professors
Krattenmaker and Salop showed that foreclosure conduct is not illusory and can lead to harm to
competition by raising the costs of competitors and allowing the perpetrator to achieve or
maintain monopoly power.19 Professor Kaplow and others showed the errors in the claim that
exclusionary vertical restraints could not be used to extend or maintain monopoly power.20
As Professor Jonathan Baker has observed, rote invocation of error cost analysis can
itself produce errors, particularly with respect to exclusionary conduct.21 Continued reliance on

17

See, e.g., Posner, Exclusionary Practices, supra note 12; see also Robert H. Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox 134-60 (1978) (advocating more demanding standards for demonstrating
injury to competition).
18

See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 Am.
Econ. Rev. 388 (1987); B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106
J. Pol. Econ. 64 (1998); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); Eric B.
Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1137 (1991); Michael H. Riordan &
Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 Antitrust L.J.
513 (1995); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837
(1990).
19

Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 18, at 230-31 (explaining valid foreclosure theories).

20

See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397, 400-01 (2009) (explaining that absent restrictive
assumptions, tying can increase monopoly profits absent efficiencies); Louis Kaplow, Extension
of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515 (1985) (explaining the limited
applicability of the single monopoly profit theory).
21

See Baker, supra note 15, at 29-30, 37-38 (“To protect a robust, effective, and socially
beneficial competition policy, antitrust policy must avoid the erroneous application of error cost
analysis.”); see also Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive
-6-

what are now exaggerated fears of “false positives,” and failure adequately to consider the harm
from “false negatives,” have led courts to impose excessive demands of proof on plaintiffs that
belie both established procedural norms and sound economic analysis.22 This does not result in
more reasonable antitrust standards, but instead results in an embedded ideological preference
for non-intervention and a “thumb on the scales”23 that creates a tendency toward false negatives,
particularly in modern markets characterized by economies of scale and network effects.24
Indeed, the effect goes well beyond a “thumb on the scales,” because it effectively shifts the
default presumption from neutral to pro-defense. There are also excessive administrative costs,
as ever “more” evidence is demanded, without regard for its cost or whether it is likely to
significantly improve the accuracy of decisions.
In this article, we build on this prior work to explain how these erroneous assumptions
about markets, institutions, and conduct have distorted the antitrust decision-making process and
produced an excessive risk of false negatives in exclusionary conduct cases involving firms

Economy 73–77 (2019) (discussing the relationship of error-cost analysis to legal presumptions).
Cf. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints?
Horizontal and Vertical Working in Tandem, 83 Antitrust L.J. 15 (2020) (analyzing evidence
that cartels use vertical restraints to facilitate horizontal collusion).
22

A recent and potent example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138
S. Ct. 2274, 2284-88 (2018) (denigrating the role of direct evidence of competitive harm and
shifting to the plaintiff the burden to disprove the sufficiency of the defendant’s proffered
justifications for its conduct).
23

See Baker, supra note 15, at 6.

24

Economies of scale occur when a firm has lower average costs at higher levels of output.
Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 36 (4th ed. 2005).
Network effects occur when customers perceive product quality as higher when other customers
purchase the product, for example, in the case of social media. See Carl Shapiro & Hal R.
Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 184 (1999); Jeffrey
Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 Bell J. Econ. &
Mgmt. Sci. 16 (1974).
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attempting to achieve, maintain, or enhance dominance or substantial market power. To redress
this imbalance, we integrate modern economic analyses and the teachings of decision theory with
the foundational conventions of antitrust law; these conventions have long relied on probability,
presumptions, and reasonable inferences to provide effective means for evaluating competitive
effects and resolving antitrust claims.
In Part I, we review the essential role that probability, presumptions, and inferences have
played in shaping antitrust law’s approach to defining evidentiary burdens. In Part II, we briefly
explain the role decision theory should play in designing antitrust rules in the context of current
case law and economic learning, and critically examine the Chicago-School critiques of 1960s
antitrust and explain why their relevance is much reduced today. In Part III, we propose a series
of guiding principles and advocate for easing of the burdens placed on plaintiffs to establish
anticompetitive harm. We propose eliminating continued reliance on the unwarranted
assumptions that have raised the plaintiff’s burden in exclusionary conduct cases and tipped the
litigation scales in favor of defendants and provide suggestions for how procompetitive
presumptions might be more narrowly tailored.
I.

The Rule of Reason, Competitive Harm, and The Role of Probability, Inference, and
Presumption
A. The Origins of the Rule of Reason
Since its emergence in Standard Oil,25 the rule of reason has been rooted in probability,

not certainty.26 The Supreme Court explained that conduct could be deemed “unreasonably

25

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911).
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restrictive of competitive conditions” if it “were of such a character as to give rise to the
inference or presumption” that it was “restraining the free flow of commerce and tending to
bring about the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against public
policy.”27 Seven years later, the Court again emphasized the probabilistic nature of judgments
under the rule of reason in Board of Trade of Chicago.28 In Justice Brandeis’s statement of the
rule of reason, he explained that the court “must ordinarily consider . . . the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable.”29
From these two pillars, the modern rule of reason with its focus on competitive effects
later developed in National Society of Professional Engineers30 and National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n.31 Writing for the Court in both cases, Justice Stevens drew heavily on Standard Oil and
Chicago Board of Trade, synthesizing the key elements of presumption, inference, and
26

See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
Supreme Court in Standard Oil used the “rule of reason” to “describe the proper inquiry under
both” Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); Baker & Gavil, supra note 10 (same); see also Steven
C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and
Microsoft, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 617, 647–48, 652 (1999) (suggesting the application of
Section 1’s anticompetitive effects test to Microsoft’s conduct under Section 2).
27

Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the use of
“presumption[s]” in interpreting and applying the Sherman Act was rooted in the common law,
on which its core prohibitions were modeled. Id. at 27, 58.
28

Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States (Chicago Board of Trade), 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

29

Id. at 238 (emphasis added); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183,
203 n.10 (2010) (“Justice Brandeis provided the classic formulation of the Rule of Reason in
Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States . . . .”).
30

Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Professional Engineers also
emphasized that the rule of reason focuses on competitive effects. See id. at 692 (“[T]he purpose
of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint . . . .”);
see also Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the
Millennium, 68 Antitrust L.J. 187, 188 (2000) (advocating a “first principles” approach to
evaluating market power and anticompetitive effects).
31

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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probability. He explained that unreasonableness could be based on either “the nature or character
of the contracts, or . . . on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption
that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices.”32 Probabilistic assessments of
likely competitive harm also are the basis of the “per se rule,” an application of the rule of reason
that irrebuttably presumes conduct will restrain competition unreasonably.33
Although the rule of reason has evolved mainly in the context of Section 1 horizontal
restraints law, this learning applies equally to exclusionary conduct cases under both Sections 1
and 2. The burden-shifting rule of reason has been used in concerted exclusionary conduct cases
like Visa34 and RealComp II.35 It also has been used to structure the analysis in several leading
Section 2 cases involving single firm conduct, including Microsoft,36 McWane,37 and ZF

32

Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added).

33

See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940) (noting that
price-fixing agreements are “banned because of their actual or potential threat” to competition);
N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[A]greements [highly likely to be
anticompetitive] are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).
34

United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding it unlawful
under Section 1 for Visa-member banks collectively to agree that they would not issue
competing American Express or Discover cards).
35

Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824–25 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that it is
unlawful under Section 1 for members of a multiple listing service to impede consumer access to
information about non-traditional real estate services offered by on-line brokers).
36

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Viamedia, Inc.
v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying Microsoft’s burden-shifting
framework under Section 2).
37

McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015).
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Meritor.38 Indeed, Standard Oil involved exclusionary conduct and included claims under both
Sections 1 and 2.39
B. Satisfying the Plaintiff’s Burden of Production
As the rule of reason evolved, this reliance on probabilistic assessments of likely harm
remained one of its core characteristics.40 Per se prohibition was reserved for conduct with a very
high probability of harm. In other cases, the level of scrutiny and the likelihood of liability were
calibrated to the nature and strength of the evidence of probable harm, whether circumstantial or
direct, as well as presumptions based on the nature of the restraint, experience and the
overarching goals of the Sherman Act.
Presumptions have consistently played a role in antitrust law when the prediction of
competitive harm is deemed sound and, in some cases, when combined with some limited
market-specific analysis.41 NCAA, Indiana Federation of Dentists,42 and California Dental43
further developed that long-standing role, clarifying the respective burdens of the parties to
antitrust litigation. A plaintiff can meet its burden of production through a rebuttable
38

ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281 (3d Cir. 2012).

39

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1911).

40

See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (finding that the “blanket
license” utilized by ASCAP and BMI did not warrant per se condemnation because the practice
was not a “naked restraint” that “always or almost always” tended to unreasonably restrain
competition); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50, 50 n.16 (1977)
(holding that the use of a per se approach to the rule of reason should be limited to conduct that
is “manifestly anticompetitive” and noting that “[t]he probability that anticompetitive
consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be
balanced against its pro-competitive consequences”).
41

See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–94 (1978);
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
42

FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).

43

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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anticompetitive presumption when economic theory predicts a relatively high or “obvious”
probability of competitive harm.44 Courts also recognized that a plaintiff could meet its burden of
production for competitive harm with a “double inference:”45 courts could infer market power
from high market shares and other factors in a defined market; combining this inference with
conduct that has a tendency to be anticompetitive, competitive harm could then be inferred-precisely because that tendency increases in the presence of market power.46 Finally, the
Supreme Court has also recognized that when direct evidence of probable anticompetitive effect
is proffered, neither presumption nor inference is required.47

44

Id. at 770; see also Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36–37. The strongest rule of reason cases
from the perspective of the plaintiff will include both direct and circumstantial evidence of harm.
See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827–34 (6th Cir. 2011) (evaluating both direct
and circumstantial evidence of competitive harm under the rule of reason). The Supreme Court’s
decisions in NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists were part of a larger movement to
alleviate the burden of production (and proof) on plaintiffs in cases involving relatively more
obvious anticompetitive conduct. See Gavil, supra note 11, at 755–57.
45

For an explanation of this “double inference” method of establishing competitive harm, see
Andrew I. Gavil et al., Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in
Competition Policy 544–45 (3d ed. 2017).
46

See, e.g., Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 823 (“Realcomp's substantial market power, combined with
the likely anticompetitive tendencies of its policies, rendered the policies unreasonable due to
their likely anticompetitive effects.”).
47

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109
(1984) (“[W]hen there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.’”) (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978);
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460–61 (“‘[P]roof of actual detrimental effects, such as a
reduction of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a
‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”) (quoting 7 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1511, at
429 (3d ed. 1986)).

- 12 -

In evidentiary terms, direct evidence of probable competitive harm can eliminate the need
to rely on circumstantial evidence, and hence either presumption or inference.48 This is not,
however, a short cut or “quick look” that somehow avoids a showing of market power.49 Quite to
the contrary, when direct evidence of competitive harm is available, market power also has been
shown.50 As understood by the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not suggest that such direct
proof was a requirement of rule of reason analysis, but rather that such proof met the plaintiff’s
burden of production and hence eliminated the necessity of reliance on circumstantial evidence.51
Indeed, direct evidence of anticompetitive effects on price and output also can be
sufficient to rebut a defendant’s efficiency justifications. When direct evidence of
anticompetitive effects has been shown (and not undermined), the plaintiff in effect has
preemptively shown that any procompetitive benefits were inadequate to eliminate the
demonstrated anticompetitive effects in the market.52

48

Similarly, courts in conspiracy cases do not rely on “plus factor” analysis to infer agreement
when there is direct evidence of agreement, such as bylaws, a contract, or communications
revealing a conspiracy. See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651,
661–62 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that direct evidence in Section 1 conspiracy is “evidence
tantamount to an acknowledgment of guilt”).
49

Assembling direct evidence of harm is not necessarily “quick,” relative to the circumstantial
route. Obtaining direct proof may require significant investigation and evidence gathering. Direct
proof also is likely to involve different economic methods, although there may be overlap with
direct evidence of market power.
50

Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text;
infra note 114 and accompanying text.
51

See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (interpreting
Supreme Court decisions as rejecting the argument that a quick look approach is only available
when evidence of actual harm is proffered).
52

See, e.g., Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461 (“[T]he finding of actual, sustained adverse
effects on competition in those areas where IFD dentists predominated, viewed in light of the
reality that markets for dental services tend to be relatively localized, is legally sufficient to
- 13 -

C. The “Enquiry Meet for the Case”
In moving away from reliance on bright line approaches, the courts continued to use
probability assessments to apply the rule of reason flexibly, depending on the strength of the
evidence presented by the parties and by recognizing appropriate presumptions. A more precise
statement of the “per se rule,” for example, is “per se unreasonableness”--an application of the
rule of reason that involves an irrebuttable presumption that the conduct is highly likely to
unreasonably restrain competition.53 Similarly, what has been labelled the “quick look” can be
understood as courts utilizing a rebuttable presumption when the probability of competitive harm
is relatively high, albeit not as high as with per se unreasonableness.
This approach reached fruition in California Dental.54 The Supreme Court made it clear
that the rule of reason is a sliding-scale and that evidence of anticompetitive effects varies and
must be evaluated in the context of each case.55 The strength of any presumption of competitive
harm affects the burden on the plaintiff to undertake market analysis. It also correspondingly
affects the defendant’s evidentiary burden to rebut evidence or presumption of harm. This is the
“enquiry meet for the case.”56 It synthesized the Court’s previous decisions describing the rule of

support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the absence of elaborate
market analysis.”).
53

This view was not entirely new, as the Court had observed in the late 1950s that what was
being referred to as the “per se rule” was a “principle of per se unreasonableness.” N. Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
54

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 758 (1999).

55

Id. at 779-81; see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159–60 (2013).

56

Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 781.
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reason inquiry as focused on the probability--on tendencies--of competitive harm.57 But as the 54 division in the Court illustrated, that formulation leaves room for disagreements about the
quantity and quality of evidence needed to support an inference of probable competitive harm.
D. Developing New Presumptions
The rule of reason and its presumptions should continue to evolve over time as economic
learning advances and courts gain further experience with industries and firm practices. The
decisions of Leegin58 and Actavis59 invited lower courts to consider the adoption of appropriate
presumptions based on experience in applying the rule of reason (respectively) to intrabrand
vertical price agreements and pay-for-delay cases.60 In this regard, after discussing the decision
theory framework and examining certain assumptions made by conservative commentators and
the presumptions that flow from those assumptions, we propose principles to guide the evolution
of the rule of reason for exclusionary conduct in today’s modern marketplace. Our goal is to

57

This approach also aligned the rule of reason as applied under Section 1 with the structured
approaches that the Court, and the lower courts, had been developing in other areas of antitrust
law, including monopolization under Section 2 and mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
See Baker & Gavil, supra note 10.
58

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007) (“Courts can,
for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to
make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to
promote procompetitive ones.”) (emphasis added).
59

Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159–60.

60

For a definition of “intrabrand competition,” see Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (“Interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of
the same generic product--television sets in this case--and is the primary concern of antitrust
law. . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors-wholesale or retail--of the product of a particular manufacturer.”). “Pay-for-delay” agreements,
also referred to as “reverse payment” agreements, are explained and examined in FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
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avoid the excessive false negatives that are highly likely to flow from unduly permissive antitrust
rules grounded in outdated non-interventionist presumptions and assumptions.
II: Achieving a Sound Decision-Theoretic Approach to Antitrust Legal Standards for
Exclusionary Conduct
A. Decision Theory and Probabilistic Competitive Harm
It has been recognized for decades that decision theory is useful for understanding and
formulating legal standards.61 Making legal decisions based on probability, inferences, and
presumptions is consistent with a decision-theoretic approach to legal rules. Decision theory
provides a methodology for information-gathering and decision-making when outcomes are
uncertain, information is inherently imperfect, and information is costly to obtain. This
methodology is a rational process in which a decision-maker begins with initial beliefs (i.e.,
presumptions) based on prior knowledge and then gathers additional information (i.e., evidence)
to supplement the presumption in order to make a better, more accurate decision.62
Decision theory recognizes that some erroneous decisions are inevitable because it is not
economical, or even possible, to achieve perfect information. Even if the evidence suggests that
61

There is a large literature on the application of decision theory to antitrust. See, e.g., C.
Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 Antitrust
L.J. 41 (1999); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974). For further discussion of its application in assigning
burdens of proof, see Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale L.J.
1254 (2013); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 Yale L.J. 738 (2012).
62

See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065,
1084–86 (1968); Morris H. DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions 135–40 (1970); Howard
Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty 27–33
(1968). In the language of Bayesian probability theory, the decision-maker begins with a “prior”
probability, gathers information, and then forms a “posterior” probability by rationally
combining the prior probability and the information. Here we are not using “presumption” in the
formal legal sense, but as a synonym for “assumptions” or “priors.”
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the conduct in a particular case is beneficial, the conduct actually may be harmful, or vice versa.
Formulating an optimal legal standard would involve balancing to the extent possible the
expected consumer welfare harm from “false positive” errors (i.e., erroneously prohibiting
beneficial conduct) versus “false negative” errors (i.e., erroneously permitting harmful conduct).
Analysis of error costs would require information on the incidence and consequences of error.
The analysis also would take into account the impact of the legal rule on deterrence, that is, on
future participants’ choice of conduct in light of the legal standard.63 It also could take into
account the cost of the administrative process, including the cost of delay.
Presumptions also play a key role in setting evidentiary burdens under the rule of reason.
The recognition of a presumption is a question of law. The court would identify and gauge the
strength of its initial economic presumption regarding the likely competitive impact of the
conduct. This presumption would be rationally based on logic, experience, and economic
evidence about the industry and the category of conduct.64 The presumption regarding the

63

Deterrence effects are distinguishable from the issue of judicial errors for a given legal
standard. For example, a rule of per se legality would be easy to administer and would not lead a
district court to issue erroneous “false convictions.” But such a legal standard might not be
optimal because it would not deter any anticompetitive conduct in that category. For discussion
of deterrence, see Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof,
55 Ariz. L. Rev. 557, 580, 593 (2013). False positives as well as false negatives tend to lead to
under-deterrence of anticompetitive conduct in some circumstances. See Steven C. Salop,
Merger Settlement and Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81
Fordham L. Rev. 2647, 2668–69, 2669 n.60 (2013) (explaining that compliance incentives
decrease when the probability of error of either type increases).
64

A key assumption of decision theory is that the initial presumptions of the court are rational
and accurate. Confirmation bias involves (unconsciously) interpreting evidence as supporting
one’s prior views, which amounts to dysfunctional Bayesian inference. For one survey, see
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 Rev.
Gen. Psychol. 175, 211 (1998) (“Our natural tendency seems to be to look for evidence that is
directly supportive of hypotheses we favor and even, in some instances, of those we are
entertaining but about which we are indifferent.”).
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category of conduct could be anticompetitive, procompetitive, or neutral (i.e., equally likely to be
anticompetitive or procompetitive). The strength of the presumption would vary with the degree
of variation in the likely effects of the conduct. Because any single district court is likely to have
very limited information about the probable categorical effects of conduct, appellate courts and
the Supreme Court are better positioned to make judgments about presumptions. The recognition
and formulation of presumptions, therefore, should be left to appellate courts, the Supreme
Court, and Congress, with district courts constrained to their role as implementers.
A legal standard can be characterized as the combination of the evidentiary preconditions
that will trigger a presumption and an evidentiary standard to rebut the presumption.65 The
optimal evidentiary standard would balance the direction and strength of the presumption with
the reliability and cost of the available evidence. For example, suppose that the presumption is
that some category of conduct is more likely harmful.66 A court could reflect this presumption (i)
by treating the presumption as sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s initial burden, or (ii) by placing
a relatively low burden of production of case-specific evidence on the plaintiff. The court also
65

These evidentiary rebuttal standards would include the respective burdens of pleading,
production, and proof for plaintiffs and defendants.
66

Such a presumption might not be as simple as “conduct A is so likely to be anticompetitive
that we presume it will be,” as is the case for some per se prohibitions. It might instead be that
“conduct A, in the presence of facts B, C, and D, is highly likely to be anticompetitive.” Such
qualified presumptions have been used by the Supreme Court in connection with certain kinds of
group boycotts, see Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 295–97 (1985) (“Unless the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an
element essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always likely
to have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted.”), and tying arrangements, see Jefferson Par.
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12–16 (1984) (“[W]e have condemned tying
arrangements when the seller has some special ability--usually called ‘market power’--to force a
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market.”). They similarly are
used in merger law, where the anticompetitive presumption depends on the level of concentration
and market shares of the merging firms as well as the change in concentration that the proposed
merger will bring about. United States v. Phila. Nat’l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
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might place a higher burden of production or even persuasion on the defendant to rebut the
plaintiff’s presumption and case-specific evidence. A stronger presumption and evidence of harm
would raise the defendant’s rebuttal burden. The plaintiff’s burden of producing evidence of
competitive harm analogously would be higher for presumptively procompetitive categories of
conduct.
The cost of information also suggests the potential benefits from a structured and
sometimes truncated process.67 As we have noted, the term “per se illegality” describes an
irrebuttable presumption of harm for certain categories of conduct. The FTC and some courts
have used the term “inherently suspect,” a term first used by the Supreme Court in the context of
merger analysis,68 to describe conduct that warrants a strong, but rebuttable presumption of
likely harm, given certain other conditions.69 In some cases, the presumption may be insufficient
by itself to shift the burden, but might have a supporting role along with other case-specific

67

See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990) (“[T]he justification
for these per se rules is rooted in administrative convenience.”); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that per se presumption “avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries”).
68

Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363 (explaining that the use of a presumption in the context of
merger analysis “lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose
size makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue
concentration”).
69

See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 358–61 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying an
inherently suspect “‘quick-look’ rule-of-reason analysis” to a case of alleged horizontal pricefixing activities); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(“[C]onduct that ‘appears likely, absent an efficiency justification, to restrict competition and
decrease output’--is to be presumed unreasonable.” (quoting Polygram Holding, Inc. Docket No.
9298, 22-24 (F.T.C. July 28, 2003) (Opinion of the Commission),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/07/polygramopinion.pdf)); In re
Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 459, 470–71 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying the approach to
auto dealerships charged with anti-competitive action in keeping their showrooms closed certain
days of the week).
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evidence. Thus, this decision-theoretic approach can be used to interpret and extend the “sliding
scale” approach to applying the rule of reason even in the absence of an anticompetitive
presumption.
Under the rule of reason, it might be useful to limit the amount of information necessary
to evaluate competitive effect. Demanding more information in some cases can lead to more
errors or worsened deterrence. Certain evidence may not be reasonably available or will be
unreliable because it (i) too often signals an erroneous conclusion, or (ii) is too likely subject to
confusion, misinterpretation, or bias by the trial court or jury.70 Collecting and presenting
additional information is not costless and may have diminishing returns and only marginal
benefits, if any.71 Moreover, requiring additional evidence disadvantages the plaintiff, which has
the initial burden and the ultimate burden of proof. It also can deter meritorious cases, leading to
under-deterrence.
B. The Chicago-School’s Reliance on Decision Theory to Support its Critique of Antitrust
Chicago-School commentators applied a decision-theoretic framework to argue that
antitrust law as it existed in the 1960s tended towards false positives, including over-deterrence

70

See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702(c) (expert opinion testimony can be excluded
if is not “the product of reliable principles and methods”).
71

The collection of evidence should be “proportional to the needs of the case,” including
“whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See also Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 Issues in
Competition Law and Policy 125, 129 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) (“the question
would be whether the marginal contribution to accuracy of outcome (reduction of error) derived
from additional process would be outweighed by the costs required to gather, present, and
evaluate additional information.”).
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of beneficial conduct. They attributed this tendency to a lack of appreciation for efficiency
benefits of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct, undemanding burdens of proof on plaintiffs,
bright line liability rules, and the limited competence and bias of antitrust decision-makers (i.e.,
agencies, courts, and juries) in evaluating competitive effects. These commentators also assumed
that the costs of false positives far exceeded the costs of false negatives because any
anticompetitive effects from under-enforcement (false negatives) would be dissipated by the selfcorrecting tendencies of markets, whereas any anticompetitive effects of over-enforcement (false
positives) would prove durable due to the longevity of legal precedent.72
They were especially skeptical of anticompetitive concerns regarding exclusionary
conduct. They suggested that complaining rivals were highly likely to be inefficient competitors,
who were attempting to use antitrust to prevent more efficient larger firms from competing on
the merits to the benefit of consumers.73 Intrabrand vertical restraints were assumed to be
procompetitive in most cases and potential exclusionary effects were dismissed or ignored.74
Interbrand restraints, such as exclusive dealing, were assumed to be generally efficient, even if
used by firms with substantial market power.75 Robert Bork argued that foreclosure was illusory

72

See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 2. For a more recent example, see generally Murat C.
Mungan & Joshua Wright, Optimal Standards of Proof in Antitrust 3 (George Mason Univ. Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 19-20, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428771
[https://perma.cc/DRX7-X5SB].
73

See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J.L. & Econ. 247, 248 (1985) (describing how firms seek antitrust protection from “the
unpleasantness of effective competition”); Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 35 (cautioning courts to
“treat suits by horizontal competitors with the utmost suspicion”).
74

See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of
Reason, 60 Antitrust L.J. 67 (1991); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981).
75

See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The Expanded Economics of Free‐Riding:
How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free‐Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty, 74 Antitrust L.J.
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and could not harm competition because there was only a single monopoly profit.76
Commentators have also suggested that monopolists drive innovation.77
These criticisms and the proposed solution of more permissive antitrust rules and higher
burdens of proof have been highly influential. Intrabrand vertical restraints are no longer
condemned per se as is also true for most exclusionary group boycotts. The per se prohibition of
tying is teetering.78 Encouraged by Matsushita79 and Twombly,80 motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment are now more commonly made. Courts and agencies also have become more

473, 519 (2007) (describing circumstances in which exclusive dealing can be deemed efficient);
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for
Distribution, 75 Antitrust L.J. 433, 435 (2008) (explaining how exclusive dealing can mitigate
issues with contracting directly with retailers); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L &
Econ. 1, 3-4 (1982) (“The most commonly expressed view of exclusive dealing in the literature
portrays it as a device to obtain increased dealer promotional effort.”).
76

Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 137–38, 140, 372-73 (1978).

77

For a discussion and critique of this argument, see Baker, supra note 15, at 13-14 (“This
‘dynamic competition’ defense of concentrated markets, or of conduct allowing firms to create or
maintain market power, is unconvincing because it ignores several important ways that greater
competition enhances incentives to innovate.”); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer,
Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm
Conduct, 4 Competition Pol’y Int’l 285, 290–92 (2008).
78

“Tying” involves the sale of a product or service only on the condition that the buyer also
purchase a second, unwanted product or service. Traditionally the practice was treated as per se
unlawful when certain conditions were also present. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984) (“Per se condemnation—condemnation without inquiry into
actual market conditions—is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable. Thus,
application of the per se rule focuses on the probability of anticompetitive consequences.”)
(footnote omitted). ). But more recently courts have been reluctant to use the per se approach in
other circumstances. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(declining to apply per se approach to platform software).
79

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–88 (1986) (revitalizing
the use of summary judgment in antitrust cases).
80

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–57 (2007) (raising the burden of pleading for
plaintiffs to state a claim under Federal Rule 8(a)(2)).
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sophisticated in evaluating economic arguments. Economic testimony is now the norm and
subject to Daubert challenges.81
The assumptions underlying these criticisms also have been very influential in producing
a non-interventionist bias in the law. For example, in Brooke Group, the Court expressed
skepticism that the cigarette oligopolists would be able to coordinate successfully after
disciplining a price-cutting rival, despite evidence that they had coordinated historically.82 The
single monopoly profit theory was treated as a broad guide in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Jefferson Parish83 and subsequent opinions by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor when they were
appellate judges, leading them to reach potentially erroneous conclusions about probable
exclusionary effects.84 The Supreme Court’s analysis in Trinko85 is partially based on the belief
that monopolists are the main engines of future innovation and should be permitted to restrict
competition to maintain their innovation incentives.86 Several courts concluded that exclusive

81

See, e.g., In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 946 F.3d 995, 1000-03 (8th Cir.
2019) (finding that the district court did not abuse discretion in applying principles of Daubert
and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to exclude testimony of plaintiff’s expert economist).
82

Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 232 (1993)
(“[R]elying on tacit coordination among oligopolists as a means of recouping losses from
predatory pricing is ‘highly speculative’”). But see id. at 253–54 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the evidence was sufficient to show the required “reasonable possibility” of harm to
competition).
83

Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The existence of
a tied product normally does not increase the profit that the seller with market power can extract
from sales of the tying product.”), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28 (2006).
84

E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 30 (2d Cir. 2006) (Winter, Pooler,
and Sotomayor, JJ.); Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1990)
(Breyer, C.J.).
85

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).

86

Id. at 407 (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices--at least for a short period--is what
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
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dealing contracts with durations of one year or less should be treated as presumptively lawful on
the ground that they are easily contestable.87
C. The Errors and Inapplicability of the Chicago-School Prescriptions for Current Antitrust
Analysis
While the Chicago-School’s analysis provided useful criticisms of 1960s legal standards,
they have gone too far in various ways. Modern economic analysis has now invalidated many of
their criticisms.88 The overarching assumption that false positives are more concerning than false
negatives because of rapid market self-correction is undermined by the observation that longlasting cartels with a significant number of participants have been observed. Market dominance
can be quite durable, in some instances lasting for decades. Barriers to entry, specifically
including barriers resulting from the incumbent monopolist’s exclusionary conduct, can prevent
market self-correction.89

economic growth.”). For a critique of Trinko, see Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution
Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 Antitrust L.J. 3, 41–51 (2004)
(“[I]t is perhaps worth inquiring whether the presumed connection between the dream of
monopoly and innovation is in fact warranted as a general proposition.”).
87

See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“Exclusive-dealing contracts terminable in less than a year are presumptively lawful . . . .”). For
a discussion of the relevant cases and the critique of this view, see Gavil, et al. supra note 45, at
1038–39.
88

For an excellent catalogue of these assumptions as they relate both to markets and institutions,
see Baker, supra note 15, at 8–36 (analyzing nine such “erroneous assumptions”); see also
Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 Antitrust L.J. 527, 528 (2013)
(“Mainstream and progressive commentators also call collusion the central antitrust problem,
although post-Chicago commentators tend more than most to take exclusionary conduct
seriously.”) (footnote omitted).
89

See Baker, supra note 21, at 17 (citing evidence that cartels, oligopolies, and monopolies have
been more durable than predicted by Chicago-School critics); see also Steven C. Salop, The
Raising Rivals' Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, and the Flawed
Incremental Price-Cost Test, 81 Antitrust L.J. 371, 391-92 (2017) (describing how foreclosure
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Chicagoans argued that competitor complaints were most likely motivated by the fear of
increased competition, which has led to skepticism of such complaints, including a
recommendation of denial of standing,90 and has been extended to promote ex ante credibility
judgments of witnesses, both positive and negative.91 In fact, the interests of competitors whose
costs are raised by exclusionary conduct are consistent with the interests of consumers whose
prices are raised as a result. While antitrust protects “competition, not competitors,” that does not
mean that competitors’ interests necessarily are opposed to consumer interests or that courts
should categorically discount the fate of competitors. This oft-repeated refrain is especially selfserving and suspect when the conduct of a firm with substantial market power has the effect of
excluding a rival that is the embodiment of market “self-correction.”92
Modern analysis also has invalidated the Chicagoan critiques of exclusionary conduct by
firms with substantial market power. The claim that anticompetitive exclusion would be
unprofitable because there is only a single monopoly profit has been shown to be invalid except

can be used to thwart market-correcting entry). See also McWane, 783 F.3d at 838 (noting FTC’s
finding that McWane’s conduct harmed competition by making effective entry more costly and
difficult).
90

Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106, 122 (1986) (finding that the
allegations of the nation's fifth-largest beef packing company about the results of a merger of the
second and third largest beef packing companies were insufficient to show a threat of antitrust
injury as a result of predatory pricing necessary to enjoin the merger under the Clayton Act); see
also Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 33-39.
91

Some courts have openly questioned the credibility of witnesses employed by the plaintiff as
self-interested, yet credited, without similar scrutiny, the testimony of the obviously selfinterested parties defending their conduct. See, e.g., United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp.
3d 161, 227, 229–30 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd sub nom. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
92

See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n a
concentrated market with very high barriers to entry, competition will not exist without
competitors.”).
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in one highly unrealistic set of market conditions.93 It also overlooks the fact that exclusionary
conduct can insulate a firm with legitimately-achieved monopoly power from new competitive
threats that might weaken or undo its market dominance.94 The idea that entrants can overcome
exclusives simply by outbidding monopolists for needed inputs fails to recognize that entrants
face disadvantages in bidding against monopolists that hold exclusives, even if the exclusives are
only short-term.95 This is because a dominant firm typically has more profits to protect by
maintaining its monopoly rather than facing a competitive market than an entrant can gain by
achieving viability in a competitive market.96
Chicagoans similarly overlook a key fact about private antitrust litigation that flows from
the asymmetric effects of competition on the profits of the incumbent monopolist versus an
entrant or small competitor. Antitrust defendants typically have systematically higher litigation

93

For a detailed exposition of these conditions, including examples of when the single monopoly
profit theory would not hold, see Gavil et. al., supra note 45, at 959-65; see also Kaplow, supra
note 20, at 515 (“There are a number of deficiencies in the analysis of recent commentators who
have attempted to proclaim the death of leverage theory.”); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note
18, at 224 (“Nor can one dismiss these claims of anticompetitive effect with the argument that
there is only a single monopoly profit and that ‘leverage’ is impossible.”).
94

See Kaplow, supra note 20, at 520–21; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 18, at 246. For a
study on how the tying of complementary products can create monopolistic positions, see Dennis
W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market
Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. Econ. 194 (2002).
95

See Salop, supra note 89, at 407–15 (“The predatory pricing paradigm and the conventional
rationale for the [incremental price-cost] test assume that bidding for distributors or customers
takes place on a level playing field. This assumption is generally not the case. A dominant
incumbent firm has significant bidding advantages.”). This mistake was evident in Judge
Easterbrook’s decision in Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir.
1996), where he concluded that a rival excluded by exclusive contracts should “try to outbid” the
two dominant incumbents “in the marketplace, rather than to outmaneuver them in court.”
96

Salop, supra note 89, at 408–10. In addition, distributors’ fears that the entrant will fail can
become a self-fulfilling prophecy by leading them to accept exclusives from the monopolist even
if the entrant offers a premium. Id. at 395.
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stakes than do private plaintiffs. This asymmetry distorts litigation incentives and likely leads to
a higher incidence of false negative errors. In an exclusionary conduct matter, for example, the
defendant is attempting to maintain or increase its ability to exercise market power. Its litigation
stakes from an injunction are equal to the reduction in profits from its resulting loss in market
power. An entrant attempting to weaken that market power by enjoining the conduct so that it
can compete in the more competitive market has stakes equal to its competitive profits. These
stakes are highly asymmetric because competitive profits typically are much lower than
monopoly profits. They also are asymmetric because the benefits of the injunction often would
be shared with other competitors. Damages (even if trebled) are a one-to-one transfer payment,
which raise the stakes equally to both parties but do not eliminate the asymmetric stakes from the
injunction.97
Because a defendant with substantial market power has higher stakes in an exclusionary
conduct case, it has systematic incentives to invest in higher litigation effort than the plaintiff in
order to tilt the outcome somewhat in its favor, relative to the underlying merits of the case.
These asymmetric litigation investment incentives lead the defendant to provide more evidence
to the court than does the plaintiff, and the court to treat this additional evidence as weakening
the plaintiff’s case, so that the court is less likely to find for the plaintiff relative to the
underlying merits of the plaintiff’s case. As a result, judicial outcomes will involve relatively
more false negatives and relatively fewer false positives, which also will lead to underdeterrence.98 Many rules of procedure and evidence, despite judicial oversight, also provide
97

Treble damages do increase the incentive to bring cases, which can increase deterrence. But
they are unlikely to offset the other deterrence-reducing effects.
98

For further analysis, see Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in
Antitrust Litigation, (Mar. 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
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ample opportunities for strategic use of litigation to delay, raise plaintiffs’ litigation costs, and
further tilt outcomes.99 Moreover, by the time a case is decided, a rival may have exited the
market or been so hobbled that it no longer poses a significant competitive threat, which renders
injunctive relief ineffective. These factors collectively reduce the plaintiff’s incentive to bring
suit, which leads to further under-deterrence.
It has long been recognized that the pursuit of monopoly spurs innovation.100 However,
this argument is sometimes misinterpreted to suggest that monopoly, once achieved, benefits

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563843 [https://perma.cc/37XDWMND]. See also Avery Katz. Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 Int’l
Rev. of L. & Econ. 127 (1988); Svetoslav Salkin, Rent Seeking with Asymmetric Players:
An Application to Litigation Expenditures, 6 Eur. J. of Legal Stud. 157 (2013). An
analogous analysis explains how asymmetric stakes in patent races favor the incumbent
monopolist. Richard J. Gilbert and David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the
Persistence of Monopoly. 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 514 (1982).
99

These can include motions to dismiss and challenges to standing and antitrust injury,
aggressive opposition to various aspects of discovery and to class certification, efforts to exclude
necessary expert testimony, motions for summary judgment, and post-trial motions.
100

See, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy 110 (1942):
Was not the observed performance due to that stream of inventions that
revolutionized the technique of production rather than to the businessman’s hunt
for profits? The answer is in the negative. The carrying into effect of those
technological novelties was of the essence of that hunt. And even the inventing
itself . . . was a function of the capitalist process which is responsible for the
mental habits that will produce invention. It is therefore quite wrong . . . to say, as
so many economists do, that capitalist enterprise was one, and technological
progress a second, distinct factor in the observed development of output; they
were essentially one and the same thing or, as we may also put it, the former was
the propelling force of the latter.

See also Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation:
Welcoming and Protecting Disruption, in Innovation Policy and the Economy 20 125, 126 (Josh
Lerner & Scott Stern eds. 2020) (“The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a
vigorous competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative
products, as they seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors
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consumers because the monopolist’s future innovation incentives exceed the incentives of their
would-be rivals.101 In fact, monopolists and dominant firms have less incentive to innovate
because they already have a monopoly market share, whereas fringe competitors have the
potential to grow their shares. What mainly incentivizes a dominant firm is the fear of losing out
to new competitors.102 Moreover, that fear can also incentivize the monopolist to engage in
exclusionary conduct to erect barriers against these potential innovators. This incentive can be
further amplified if the plaintiff’s standard of proof has been raised based on mistaken
assumptions. The combination of a desire to preserve monopoly profits, awareness that the
potential plaintiff’s burden of proof will be demanding, and the possibility that innovating rivals
may not be able to foot the cost of protracted litigation and survive in the marketplace all
combine to insulate monopolists from challenge.103
There are exceptions to the judicial success of these non-interventionist assumptions
about exclusionary conduct. In Actavis, the Court recognized that an innovator that legitimately
and to protect their existing sales from future challengers. In this fundamental way, competition
promotes innovation.”), https://www.nber.org/books/lern-13.
101

See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.”). This view arguably signaled a departure from the attitude about monopoly
power reflected in United States v. Alum. Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Many
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages
thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”).
102

Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, (reviewing
evidence) in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited 361, 376-92 (Josh Lerner
& Scott Stern eds., 2012).
103

For a more comprehensive discussion of the debate over innovation incentives, see Jonathan
B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 Antitrust L.J.
575 (2007); see also infra note 123.
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has obtained a patent monopoly should not be permitted to strike agreements with potential
entrants that would exclude them from the market for some period of time.104 In Leegin, the
Court recognized exclusionary conduct concerns from resale price maintenance--it explained
how vertical restraints can be used to maintain single firm market power by foreclosing
innovative retailers or manufacturers.105 Similarly, several circuit courts have recognized the
significant anticompetitive concerns from exclusive dealing and similar conduct by firms with
substantial market power, especially when implemented in response to new competitive
challenges.106
In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit explained how exclusionary conduct can erect
anticompetitive entry barriers to innovative, nascent competitors,107 and endorsed a structured,
burden-shifting framework for evaluating exclusionary conduct akin to the Section 1 rule of
reason standard that requires defendants to establish procompetitive justifications for their

104

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).

105

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (“A dominant
retailer, for example, might request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in
distribution that decreases costs.”). See also John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, Raising Retailers’
Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, 104 Am. Econ. Rev. 672 (2014)
(examining exclusionary uses of minimum resale price maintenance and other vertical
contracting practices).
106

See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 827 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Exclusive dealing]
arrangements can harm competition in certain circumstances . . . .”); see also ZF Meritor, LLC v.
Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The primary antitrust concern with exclusive
dealing arrangements is that they may be used by a monopolist to strengthen its position, which
may ultimately harm competition.”); United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d
Cir. 2005) (“The economic impact of an exclusive dealing arrangement is amplified in the
stagnant, no growth context of the artificial tooth field.”); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,
290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence that USTC sought to
achieve its goals of excluding competition and competitors’ products by . . . . [E]nter[ing] into
exclusive agreements with retailers in an effort to exclude rivals’ products.”).
107

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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conduct once the plaintiff has met its initial burden of showing anticompetitive effects.108 In ZF
Meritor, the Third Circuit declined to apply a Brooke Group-style price/cost test109 to loyalty
discounts accompanied by other exclusionary contract restrictions, relying instead on a similar,
burden-shifting structure.110 In McWane, the Eleventh Circuit also applied a Section 1 rule of
reason approach to exclusive dealing and declined to adopt a procompetitive presumption.111 The
courts in both McWane and Dentsply found that the claimed efficiency benefits were invalid or
non-existent, as did the Microsoft court for most of the challenged restraints.112
Despite this progress, the skeptical assumptions of some conservatives continue to run
deep in antitrust analysis and law. Plaintiffs continue to face arguments about conduct,
institutions, and market structure to persuade courts to impose overly demanding burdens of
production and proof. Most recently, in Ohio v. American Express Co., the Court declined to rely
on direct evidence of anticompetitive effect of the challenged exclusionary vertical restraints in
the context of a two-sided platform.113 It instead mandated that proof of market power through
circumstantial evidence in the form of a defined relevant market was also required despite the

108

Id. at 58-59.

109

Brooke Group established a two-part the test for predatory pricing that requires evidence of
both below cost pricing and a probability that the alleged predator will be able to later recoup its
losses. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
110

ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 277 (“[B]ecause price itself was not the clearly predominant
mechanism of exclusion, the price-cost test cases are inapposite, and the rule of reason is the
proper framework within which to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims.”).
111

McWane, 783 F.3d at 833–35.

112

Id. at 840–42; United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2005);
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 62–64; 66–67; 71–72.
113

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).
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fact that the direct evidence of anticompetitive effects on consumers also proved that the
defendant had market power.114
In light of this history, the time has come to consider more systematically how a more
modern analysis should be combined with the insights of decision theory to update antitrust
presumptions and the burden of proof placed on plaintiffs under the rule of reason in
exclusionary conduct challenges. In this way, the sliding-scale “enquiry meet for the case” can
be formulated for the current market environment. Analysis based on mistaken assumptions and
mistaken applications of decision theory are particularly worrisome in light of the growing role
of “new economy” markets that involve network effects and economies of scale that often
naturally tip these markets to dominance or monopoly and lead to durable barriers to entry.115
These barriers can be maintained or enhanced in the face of innovative potential entrants by
technological as well as traditional exclusionary conduct such as exclusive dealing, tying, and

114

Id. As Justice Breyer points out in dissent, the Court’s previous recognition that direct
evidence of competitive harm is sufficient to shift a burden of production to the defendant and
require a showing of procompetitive effects should have been “fully applicable” in the case. Id.
at 2296 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer further observed that “[t]he majority thus, in a footnote,
seems categorically to exempt vertical restraints from the ordinary ‘rule of reason’ analysis that
has applied to them since the Sherman Act’s enactment in 1890” and adds that “[o]ne critical
point that the majority’s argument ignores is that proof of actual adverse effects on competition
is, a fortiori, proof of market power. Without such power, the restraints could not have brought
about the anticompetitive effects that the plaintiff proved.” Id. at 2297.
115

In the Second Edition of his antitrust law treatise, Judge Posner recognized the greater
concerns about exclusionary conduct in “new economy” markets such as internet platforms with
network effects. However, he still proposed that the monopolist is entitled to use practices that
are employed widely in industries that resemble the monopolist’s but are competitive. Richard
A. Posner, Antitrust Law 253–54 (2d ed. 2001).
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vertical mergers, and various kinds of contractual restraints, as well as by serial acquisition
strategies that eliminate the most promising potential competitors.116
III.

Recommended Guiding Principles for Operationalizing the “Enquiry Meet for the
Case” For Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct
California Dental Ass’n,117 Leegin118 and Actavis119 invited courts to continue to

formulate evidentiary burdens, including presumptions, as they gain more experience under the
rule of reason. In response to that invitation, we propose a set of “guiding principles” for courts
evaluating the competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. These proposals reflect decision
theory, modern economic analysis and legal precedent, and current market conditions. They are
intended to structure the inquiry in a rational way, correcting for the various mistaken
assumptions that exaggerate current perceptions of the likelihood of false positives, understate
concerns for false negatives, and impose excessive burdens on plaintiffs.
In the conventional rule of reason decision framework, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of producing sufficient evidence of likely competitive harm. It can satisfy this burden
with direct or circumstantial evidence, an appropriate anticompetitive presumption, or some
combination. If the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to provide justifications, that is, sufficient evidence of cognizable procompetitive
116

Indeed, while no single acquisition may be likely to “substantially lessen competition” and so
violate Section 7, the series might be susceptible to analysis as monopolizing conduct under
Section 2.
117

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999).

118

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007) (“Courts
can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified,
to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to
promote procompetitive ones.”).
119

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158–60 (2013).
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benefits of the challenged conduct.120 If the defendant satisfies this requirement, the burden of
production then shifts back to the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence, i.e., that the conduct is more likely to be anticompetitive than
not.
This is a sliding scale standard in that stronger evidence of competitive harm (or a
stronger anticompetitive presumption) requires the defendant to produce stronger evidence of
efficiency benefits, and vice versa. A procompetitive presumption analogously would require the
plaintiff to provide stronger evidence of competitive harm. The inevitable uncertainty that
accompanies antitrust decision-making requires reasonable means of assessing and determining
the probability of competitive harm in the first step, including the relevant presumptions.
We propose a number of principles to guide the implementation of this framework,
including the allocation of burdens and the adoption of anticompetitive and procompetitive
presumptions.

A. Basic Structure of the Inquiry and Allocation of Burdens
1. The Default Presumption Under the Rule of Reason Should Be “Neutral” Competitive
Effects

120

A presumption may be rebutted by evidence undermining its basis or “affirmatively”
offsetting its implication. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir.
1990). As one court recently held, however, the burden of pleading should be distinguished from
the burden of production. See Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 460 (7th Cir.
2020) (“[B]alancing anticompetitive effects against hypothesized justifications depends on
evidence and is not amenable to resolution on the pleadings . . . .”); see also id. at 462 (“[T]he
calculation of procompetitive benefits net of anticompetitive harms does not easily lend itself to
a pleading standard.”).
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Civil antitrust claims generally do not warrant different treatment than any other kind of
civil enforcement. The rule of reason benchmark standard requires the plaintiff to prove that
anticompetitive effects are “more likely than not,” or, as it applies to all civil antitrust cases, “by
a preponderance of the evidence.” This evidentiary standard is consistent with a “neutral”
presumption of likely competitive effects, that is, that the category of conduct is no more likely
to reduce consumer welfare than to increase welfare.121
For example, Leegin adopted the conventional rule of reason, which requires the plaintiff
to show likely anticompetitive effects by a preponderance of the evidence. While it eliminated
the previous anticompetitive presumption, it also detailed circumstances under which minimum
resale price maintenance could be anticompetitive, and adopted a neutral ex ante presumption,
not a procompetitive presumption.
The next several principles explain the appropriate evidentiary burden on the plaintiff.
2. The Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Burden Should Not Be Elevated Ex Ante
a. The Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Burden Should Be Probable Anticompetitive Effects, Not Actual
Anticompetitive Effects
As discussed in Part I, the rule of reason has always focused on probable anticompetitive
effects and “tendency.” It should be sufficient for the plaintiff to satisfy its initial burden and
shift the burden to the defendant by showing either actual or probable anticompetitive harm, not
definitive proof.
b. The Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Burden Should Not Require Quantification
121

The fact that ties are resolved in favor of the defendant might suggest that the presumption is
“marginally procompetitive” rather than “neutral.” If so, the “margin” is considered very small.
But see generally Mungan & Wright, supra note 71 (advocating a higher than preponderance
standard for antitrust).
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Courts should not require quantification of harm as part of the plaintiff’s burden.
Quantification evidence of “actual” harm is not required by the leading cases, which simply
recognize that direct evidence of likely harm obviates the need for circumstantial proof.122
Moreover, imposing a requirement of evidence of actual harm would move the needle from
reasonable probability closer to a standard of near-certainty more typically associated with
criminal prosecution, and likely would lead to excessive false negatives.
A quantification requirement would also add substantial and unnecessary additional cost
resulting from discovery and protracted litigation over expert methodologies. No empirical
methodology is perfect, and complete and accurate information is likely to be rare, so some
criticisms can be made of even the most rigorous and careful empirical methodology. Evaluating
the importance of the criticisms can be difficult for generalist courts facing significant docket
pressures. This distortion is exacerbated by the fact that the standard test for statistical
significance of econometric results is focused on avoiding false positives and places no value on
avoiding false negatives.123
3. Direct Proof of Market Power or Anticompetitive Effects Should Obviate the Need for
Circumstantial Proof
When reliable direct evidence of market power or anticompetitive effect is presented,
courts should not require plaintiffs to also demonstrate market power with circumstantial
evidence by defining a relevant market, calculating market shares, and evaluating barriers to
122

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
123

Cf. Phillip Johnson, Edward Leamer & Jeffrey Leitzinger, Statistical Significance and
Statistical Error in Antitrust Analysis, 81 Antitrust L.J. 641, 643 (2017) (arguing for an
approach that recognizes false negatives).
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entry. As the Court observed in Indiana Federation of Dentists, market power inferred from
market shares in a defined market is a second best “surrogate” and is unnecessary when more
direct evidence of market power or anticompetitive effects is provided.
In evaluating exclusionary conduct, courts also should avoid the false negatives that
would result from failing to connect the market power analysis to the allegations of
anticompetitive effect. In a monopoly maintenance case, for example, a court should not evaluate
the profitability of price increases since the allegation centers on conduct designed to prevent
price decreases.124 Courts also should not immunize exclusionary conduct by monopolists by
using a threshold market power filter to conclude that a firm lacks monopoly power because it
faces competition when it is accused of using that power to impair or destroy those very
competitors.
In American Express, the Court required the plaintiff to prove market power in the twosided platform with circumstantial evidence, despite the fact that direct evidence of
anticompetitive effects was provided and should have been sufficient economic proof of market
power.125 Imposing that additional requirement is inefficient and merely raises the plaintiff’s
cost, while potentially masking the defendant’s lack of sufficient justification because it prevents
the burden from shifting. It makes no economic or legal sense to require inferior evidence when
superior evidence already has been provided. If the Court wished to raise the plaintiff’s
evidentiary burden, it would have been better to require additional evidence of harm, as
discussed below.126
124

See Salop, supra note 30, at 194–201 (discussing “Cellophane Trap” and variants in a first
principles approach).
125

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018).
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See supra note 114 (discussing Justice Breyer’s criticisms of the majority’s approach).
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4. Courts Should Set a Lower Burden on the Plaintiff in Exclusionary Conduct Cases When
the Defendant Has Substantial Market Power
Anticompetitive effects are more likely when the defendant has substantial market power.
Moreover, when the defendant has substantial market power, the asymmetric litigation incentive
effects from its higher stakes can lead to false negatives. Both of these factors suggest that courts
should resist imposing elevated burdens on plaintiffs in such circumstances and should instead
impose a lower burden to reflect the greater probability of competitive harm and the distinct
challenges of litigation against a dominant firm. This is consistent with the sliding scale and the
view that behavior by monopolists should be viewed through a “special lens,” precisely because
its power may provide it with the ability and incentive to engage in exclusionary conduct.127 We
are not, however, suggesting that substantial market power without additional evidence warrants
a presumption of competitive harm.
As we have explained, many of the arguments that firms possessing market power lack
incentives to carry out exclusionary conduct have been debunked. Market self-correction
requires existing competitors or new entrants that can expand in response to attempts to raise or
maintain monopoly prices. But monopoly power includes entry barriers, and exclusionary

127

See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined
through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws--or
that might even be viewed as procompetitive--can take on exclusionary connotations when
practiced by a monopolist.”); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir.
2005) (“Behavior that otherwise might comply with antitrust law may be impermissibly
exclusionary when practiced by a monopolist.”).
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conduct often raises barriers to entry. If there are no competitors who are not subject to the
exclusionary conduct, this self-correction process cannot occur.128
The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden also should be reduced to reflect the asymmetric
litigation stakes and the associated increased likelihood of false negatives. As discussed earlier,
these asymmetric stakes give defendants with substantial market power systematic incentives to
invest in relatively greater litigation efforts. These asymmetric litigation incentives tilt outcomes
in the direction of excessive false negatives.
Despite the substantial harms caused by monopolizing conduct, the plaintiff’s burden in
Section 2 monopolization cases often was treated as higher. One reason was grounded in
remedial concerns. The traditional remedy for monopolization was “capital punishment,” the
disintegration of the firm into separate parts, as in Standard Oil,129 United Shoe Machinery,130 or
the United States v. AT&T settlement.131 But it is now recognized that remedial concerns in
Section 2 cases can be separated from liability standards because other equitable remedies, such
as divestitures short of complete dissolution or behavioral remedies, may be mandated instead.132
A second reason may have been the categorical assumption made explicit by the Court in
128

As discussed earlier, counterstrategies by plaintiffs to outbid the monopolist to escape
exclusives are unlikely to succeed because of the monopolist’s greater stakes. See supra text
accompanying note 97.
129

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-82 (1911) (ordering the dissolution
of Standard Oil).
130

United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-52 (1968) (discussing
conditions under which divestiture can be an appropriate remedy in a monopolization case).
131

United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 160-70 (D.D.C. 1982) (determining that the
proposed divestiture from AT& T is in the public interest).
132

See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105–07 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding
for consideration of whether divestiture is an appropriate remedy); see also Andrew I. Gavil &
Harry First, The Microsoft Antitrust Cases 237–38 (2014) (discussing theoretical framework
for remedies in monopolization cases).
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Copperweld that unilateral exclusionary conduct is less of a threat to competition than is
concerted action under Section 1.133 But concerted action by smaller rivals in highly competitive
markets is unlikely to threaten competition to the same extent as unilateral exclusionary conduct
by a firm possessing substantial market power.
5. The Plaintiff’s Initial Evidentiary Burden Should Be Reduced to Reflect the Possible
Absence of a Valid Efficiency Justification
The conventional statement of the burden-shifting rule of reason typically suggests that
the defendant’s justifications must be totally ignored unless, and until, the plaintiff produces
sufficient evidence of competitive harm, where that evidence does not include any reference to
the possible lack of cognizable justifications. Such a rigid sequencing approach can lead to
excessive false negatives.134
Evaluating competitive harm first and in isolation in exclusionary conduct cases
involving dominant firms is not compelled or even suggested by decision theory135 and doing so

133

Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984).

134

In his dissent in McWane, Commissioner Wright demanded a high evidentiary burden (i.e.,
“clear evidence”) on the plaintiff to establish competitive harm in the first step to take account of
his view that the defendant’s conduct was presumptively procompetitive. He concluded that the
plaintiff failed this first step, so he never analyzed the validity of the defendant’s procompetitive
claims. In fact, they were found by the Commission (and the Eleventh Circuit) to be pretextual
and invalid. But Commissioner Wright never analyzed them or contemplated the possibility that
they might be pretextual, thereby seeking to impose an overly high bar on the plaintiff’s proof of
harm in the first step. McWane, Inc., Docket No. 9351, 50-52 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/2014/02/dissenting-statement-commissioner-joshua-d-wright-matter-mcwane-inc
[https://perma.cc/76JD-DSF7].
135

See Beckner & Salop, supra note 61, at 69 (“Thus, in decision theoretic terms, the benefit of
gathering information on efficiencies exceeds the benefit of gathering information about market
power harms. On the cost side, the view seems to be that it is relatively more difficult to gather
information on implicit market power harms than on efficiency benefits.”).

- 40 -

is inconsistent with a sliding scale approach to the burden of proof, which evaluates all of the
evidence.136 Moreover, the courts have long acknowledged that evidence of the defendant’s
purpose in adopting certain restraints can be probative for evaluating the likelihood of
competitive effects.137 The absence of a cognizable justification, for example, can strengthen a
presumption of harm.138
If consideration of the justifications is deferred, then the plaintiff’s burden to show
competitive harm should be set at a low level to account for the fact that any efficiency claims
may turn out to be pretextual, invalid, or very small. This approach would allow the sequential
burden-shifting structure to be maintained without causing excessive false negatives.139
6. The Defendant Should Not Be Able to Meet Its Burden of Production to Show Cognizable
Efficiency Benefits Based on Purely Categorical Justifications

136

Sequential analysis fits better in the context of motion practice, such as summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law, both of which specifically test the non-movant’s ability to meet
its burden of production.
137

See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[K]nowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”). Applied to
monopolization under Section 2, the Court in Aspen Skiing inferred anticompetitive purpose
from the defendant’s lack of a valid efficiency benefit. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 n.39 (1985) (“[I]ntent to engage in predation may be in the form
of . . . evidence that the conduct was not related to any apparent efficiency.” (quoting Robert H.
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 157 (1978))); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Evidence of the intent behind the conduct of a monopolist is
relevant . . . to the extent it helps us understand the likely effect of the monopolist’s conduct.”).
In McWane, the court discussed the evidence of McWane’s anticompetitive purpose in its
discussion of the plaintiff’s evidence of competitive harm. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814,
840 (11th Cir. 2015).
138

See, e.g, Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (“The
Society’s affirmative defense confirms rather than refutes the anticompetitive purpose and effect
of its agreement.”).
139

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured
Decision Procedures, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 992, 997–1003 (2019).
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Categorical justifications are often urged by defendants and conservative commentators
to support procompetitive presumptions. But general categorical evidence of benefits, especially
when based on evidence from competitive markets as is often the case, should not be sufficient
to carry the defendant’s burden once the plaintiff produces evidence of probable competitive
harm. Case-specific evidence then must be produced to support efficiency claims to support the
application of the theory to the particular case. Permitting purely theoretical justifications to
satisfy the defendant’s burden in a particular case would amount to a sub rosa presumption and
would lead to excessive false negatives. Justifications must be evaluated solely with the casespecific evidence when there is no procompetitive presumption. For example, the fact that some
exclusive dealing arrangements may be procompetitive does not mean that the one at issue is
procompetitive.
This is consistent with the treatment of theoretical evidence of competitive harm. A
plaintiff may be able to defeat a motion to dismiss if it explains its theory of harm and if its claim
is supported by allegations sufficient to make the claim plausible. But case-specific evidence is
required to avoid summary judgement. The same approach should be followed with respect to
theoretical evidence of efficiency benefits.
7. Courts Should Subject Defendant’s Justifications to a Less Restrictive Alternative
Standard
Courts should consider whether the claimed procompetitive benefits can be achieved
in large part through less restrictive alternatives that involve significantly lessened
competitive concerns. For example, once a defendant has shifted the burden back to the
plaintiff by showing a procompetitive justification, the plaintiff should be able to shift the
burden back to the defendant by identifying a plausible less restrictive alternative. At that
- 42 -

point the burden would shift back to the defendant to demonstrate why that alternative is not
feasible or would not achieve most or substantially all of the efficiency benefits. This
allocation of burdens makes sense since the defendant has superior information regarding
efficiencies.140
B. Guiding Principles for Adopting Procompetitive Presumptions for Exclusionary Conduct
by Firms with Substantial Market Power
1. Substantial Evidence Should Be Required to Justify Procompetitive Presumptions
In light of the heightened concern about the anticompetitive effects of exclusionary
conduct by firms with substantial market power, adoption of procompetitive presumptions for
such conduct should be rare and endorsed only under exceptional circumstances. Compared to
the state of antitrust law in the 1960s, defendants today have far more effective and robust
procedural options at hand to identify and eliminate truly weak antitrust claims through motions
to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions to exclude expert testimony.
Procompetitive presumptions, therefore, should be narrowly tailored and justified by substantial
theoretical or empirical categorical evidence.
a. Narrow Categories
Presumptions involving categories of conduct should be narrowly drawn and courts
should be cautious about generalizing either from one type of conduct to another or from conduct
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See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 Colum. L. Rev.
927, 982 (2016) (arguing that although plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, defendants
should bear a burden of production because, among other reasons, they “have better access to
information about their reasons for adopting a particular practice”). See generally Kaplow, supra
note 139, at 1003–15 (discussing how less restrictive alternatives analysis fits in with structured
decision procedures).
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in competitive settings to that in highly concentrated markets. The fact that a class of conduct
sometimes creates plausible procompetitive benefits may be a reason to reject an irrebuttable
anticompetitive presumption, but it does not justify a procompetitive presumption. Moreover, the
fact that certain conduct is carried out by firms lacking market power in competitive markets
does not mean that such conduct would be procompetitive in an oligopoly market or when
implemented by a firm with substantial market power. Even if the conduct has some
procompetitive benefits, it may be anticompetitive in a particular case because the market
context is different.141 Thus, while that evidence may be probative in a particular case, where the
conditions are sufficiently similar, it cannot justify a procompetitive presumption.
For example, while conceding that vertical intrabrand restraints can have procompetitive
virtues and therefore did not warrant per se condemnation, neither Leegin nor Sylvania endorsed
a presumption that they were more likely procompetitive than anticompetitive. Instead, both
restored a neutral competitive presumption.142 Similarly, the fact that certain intrabrand vertical
restraints may be useful in achieving procompetitive efficiencies does not mean that a
procompetitive presumption should be applied to interbrand vertical restraints. Neither Leegin
nor Sylvania made judgments about interbrand vertical restraints with possible exclusionary
effects, such as exclusive dealing or most-favored nation (“MFN”) provisions.143
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Similarly, just as the fact that certain conduct is “horizontal” does not automatically
justify an anticompetitive presumption, “vertical” conduct should not lead automatically to a
procompetitive presumption. Labelling the conduct as “horizontal” or “vertical,” without more,
provides insufficient information to formulate any generally applicable presumption. While
conduct might be vertical in form, any anticompetitive effects are horizontal.144
b. False Positives and False Negatives
Chicago-School claims about false negatives were formulated at a time when courts were
relying on relatively low burdens of proof and arguably expansive anticompetitive presumptions,
including a number of per se prohibitions. Those concerns are now anachronistic and largely
overstated given the evolution of the conventional rule of reason. The enforcement agencies and
the courts also have become more knowledgeable and experienced in evaluating economic
evidence. For this reason, it makes sense today to assume that the error costs from false positives
and false negatives are relatively equal. Substantial evidence about the particular category of
conduct should be required, therefore, to justify placing greater weight on false positives.
It will seldom be possible to gauge the impact of alternative legal rules (aside from per se
rules) on deterrence. If the legal standard is stable, it is hard to quantify the relative number and
competitive impact of additional false negatives versus fewer false positives if the law were
made more permissive.145 However, deterrence policy concerns could alter the presumption in
highly exceptional circumstances. For example, Brooke Group created a procompetitive
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presumption for price cuts in response to competition that remain above costs based on the view
that such price cuts are a natural competitive response, immediately benefit consumers, and any
line drawing by courts would lead to a severe risk of deterring beneficial price cuts.146
2. When an Appropriate Procompetitive Presumption Is Adopted, It Should Raise the
Plaintiff’s Burden to Show Competitive Harm, Not Append Additional Evidentiary
Requirements
If it is appropriate to place a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff, the rule of reason can
accommodate that standard by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the conduct “produce harms
disproportionate to the resulting benefits,” as suggested by Professor Hovenkamp.147 By contrast,
in setting a higher burden on the plaintiff (apparently because the conduct was labelled
“vertical”), the Court in American Express required the plaintiff to prove market power by
circumstantial evidence despite the fact that better, direct evidence of anticompetitive effects was
already provided.148 Even if it were justified, it would have made more sense for the Court to
require a stronger showing of anticompetitive effects, rather than adding unnecessary evidence of
market power simply as a make-weight.149
As another example, it has been suggested that the plaintiff should be required to provide
evidence that that the defendant’s conduct would make “no economic sense” in the absence of
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gaining monopoly power in addition to evidence of anticompetitive effects.150 This approach
would redirect the rule of reason inquiry away from its proper, sole focus on competitive effects.
Instead of merely showing that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive, plaintiffs would also
have to show something completely different: that the conduct would not have been profitable
for the dominant firm absent its contribution to the maintenance of market power.151
3. Alleged Innovation Benefits of Monopoly Should Not Justify a Procompetitive
Presumption for Exclusionary Conduct by Firms with Substantial Market Power
Courts should not permit monopolists to justify exclusionary conduct by arguing that
their resulting monopoly profits will spur future innovation. As discussed earlier, economic
analysis and associated empirical evidence do not support the general claim that a monopoly
market structure leads to more innovation. While firms innovate in the hopes of achieving a
monopoly, achieving a durable monopoly does not lead to more future innovation. To the
contrary, significant evidence suggests that competition, not monopoly, spurs innovation.152 It is
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fear of losing the monopoly that spurs the monopolist. Moreover, if the exclusionary conduct
raises competitors’ costs or barriers to entry, innovation by potential rivals would be expected to
fall, which would reduce the monopolist’s need to innovate. Permitting this justification also is
contrary to overarching antitrust policy favoring an unencumbered competitive process. It also
distorts the incentives for monopolists in favor of exclusionary strategies rather than competition
on the merits.
4. Complaints About Exclusionary Conduct by a Competitor Neither Justify a
Procompetitive Presumption nor an Imposition of a Higher Evidentiary Burden on the
Plaintiff
Competitors serve as an early tripwire for competitive concerns about exclusionary
conduct. The interests of foreclosed competitors are consistent with consumer welfare in
exclusionary conduct cases since raising rivals’ costs will lead to higher consumer prices, so the
rivals’ harm is antitrust injury. The shibboleth that antitrust law protects “competition, not
competitors” should not be used to dismiss legitimate exclusionary conduct concerns of rivals or
to attack the credibility of their testimony on the grounds that it reflects their “self-interest[s].”153
Nor should courts treat the testimony of competitor witnesses as less credible than the testimony
of the executives of a defendant’s company, whose testimony also reflects their own interests,
which may be to achieve or maintain market power. “Shoot the messenger” as a defense strategy
should be rejected as distraction.
Conclusion
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The capacity of antitrust law to identify, redress, and deter anticompetitive exclusionary
conduct has been systematically weakened over time. While there was a need for certain
adjustments fifty years ago, continued reliance on the assumptions and presumptions that led to
an overly permissive approach are no longer supportable. The evidentiary burdens courts now
impose on plaintiffs are overly demanding and likely lead to under-deterrence. They are also
handicapping the ability of antitrust enforcement to respond to the challenges of today’s
technology-driven economy.
We have explained how current law is flexible enough again to adjust its standards in
light of modern economic analysis informed by decision theory. We have also proposed a
number of guiding principles to update standards of proof, including the use of presumptions. In
this way, the sliding-scale “enquiry meet for the case” can be implemented for the current market
environment. As now-Judge Frank Easterbrook once argued, there is no natural “ratchet” in
antitrust law that channels its evolution only in one direction.154 For Easterbrook, that meant
imposing more demanding standards of proof. But the same lack of ratchet should apply today as
the continuing evolution of technology markets and modern economics suggest that greater
antitrust vigilance is needed.
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